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A Comparative Study on the Question
of ExtraterritorialApplication of the
Competition Law
I1Hyung Jung*
"Indeed, the world is ruled by little else. Practicalmen, who
believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual
influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist."
John MaynardKeynes
"The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money"
I.

Introduction

A. Globalization
This world is, maybe too unnecessarily, getting smaller. A
strong tenet of Capitalism, to achieve prosperity based on free
trade,' is already prevalent since the collapse of the Soviet
Communism. We are now in the so-called era of globalization.
Globalization, however, is one of the most controversial
concepts of recent times. The term is not very well defined. It is
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1. Every state trades with others on the assumption that it could lead itself
to economic growth under the theory of comparative advantage. According to
this theory, country A may import product X even though it can produce the
product more efficiently than country B. Country A can have a comparative
advantage in producing some other specialty like product Y rather than
producing both X and Y. See PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS,
ECONOMICS 901-4 *13th ed. 1989).
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neither "universality," nor "homogeneity., 2 It term also does not
have the same meaning as "world-wide." 3 Some scholars define it
as "the growth and interconnection in trade and financial markets
across-and often irrespective of-national boundaries, which is
facilitated by the increasing ability to use and disseminate
technology rapidly and widely.",4 In addition, this phenomenon is
not limited to a single area. It includes politics,' sociology,'
economics (rather, political economy),7 and law.' Thus, we have
an assumption that this global phenomenon influences various
fields without any geographical limit. 9

2. Alfred C. Aman, Jr., An Introduction in Symposium: The Globalization
of Law, Politics, and Markets: Implications for Domestic Law Reform, 1 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 1 (Fall 1993).

3.
4.
School
5.

It could be local or regional. Id.
Adelle Blackett, Globalizationand Its Ambiguities: Implicationsfor Law
CurricularReform, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 57, 60 n.14 (1998).
See generally JOHN DUNNING, REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

(1997); SUSAN STRANGE, THE RETREAT OF STATE (1996); LINDA WEISS, THE
MYTH OF THE POWERLESS STATE (1996).
6. See generally SAMIR AMIN, CAPITALISM IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION,
(1997); DANI RODLICK, SENSE AND NONSENSE IN THE GLOBALIZATION DEBATE,
FOREIGN POLICY (Summer 1997).
7. See generally ROBERT GILPIN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1987); ALEX E. FERNANDEZ JILBERTO AND ANDRE
MOMMEN EDS., REGIONALIZATION AND GLOBALIZATION IN THE MODERN
WORLD ECONOMY, (1996); MICHAEL VESETH, SELLING GLOBALIZATION, (1998).
8.
Globalization is in fashion. It spreads into the every field of law. Martin

Shapiro, The Globalization of Law, Politics, and Markets: Implications for
Domestic Law Reform, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 37 (Fall, 1993). Eleanor

M. Fox, Globalization and Its Challenges for Law and Society, 29 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 891 (Summer, 1998). Miguel De La Madrid H., National Sovereignty and
Globalization in Symposium International Law in Latin Americas: Rethinking
National Sovereignty in an Age of Regional Integration, 19 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 553
(Spring 1997). Alex Y. Seita, Globalization and the Convergence of Values, 30
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 429 (1997).
9.
We have already experienced the global financial crisis, which started
from Thailand in 1997 and spread throughout the world, including the developed
nation such as Japanese recession. It could mean a sign of the "New World
Disorder." See John Cassidy, The New World Disorder,NEW YORKER, Oct. 26
& Nov. 2, 1998, at 198-207 (advocating to solve world chaos by adopting Keynes

propositions). Regarding what would be the best solution to manage this crisis,
see Justin Fox, What in the world Happened to Economics?, FORTUNE, Mar. 15,
1999, at 91-102 (introducing five forefront American economists in solving this
crisis). See also "Responsible Globality: Managing the Impact of Globalization,"
the slogan adopted in the World Economic Forum, held in Davos, Switzerland in
February 1999.
Some texts may be available by visiting its website at
www.weforum.org. See also the argument as a third alternative between Lee
Kwan Yew and Kim Dae Jung in Foreign Affairs.
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B. Examples in the Legal Arena of the Competition Law

The following three examples support the assumption that
globalization has also influenced

the area

of competition

(antitrust) law. Samsung Electronics Co., one of the conglomerates in South Korea, was fined by the European Union ("EU")
Commission, charging that Samsung's acquisition of AST
Research Inc., a California-based computer manufacturer, would
have an impact on the EU market under the EU merger
regulation, even though the neither company is European.' °
Somewhere in the US, on the other hand, the directors of a
Japanese company, Nippon Paper Industries, Co. Ltd., could be

imprisoned in the near future, because the First Circuit decided
that the company violated Section One of the Sherman Act by
conspiring to fix prices of fax papers sold in the US with its
American subsidiary partners."
There is a more well-known case, which is not strictly an
antitrust law case. Kodak sought Section 301 remedies for its
denial of access to the Japanese film market against the Japanese

government's "unreasonable toleration" of anti-competitive trade
practices by Fuji. 2 When Fuji denied all those allegations, the
United States Trade Representative ("USTR") instituted a formal
dispute resolution proceeding in the dispute settlement panel of

the World Trade Organization ("WTO")."3

The panel of the

WTO rejected the US claim. 4 It is interesting to see, however,

10. NAT'L L.J., Feb. 23, 1998.
11. U.S. v. Nippon Paper Industries Co., Ltd., 109 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997). One
commentator calls it a "hydrogen bomb in global trade wars where US
companies feel threatened by unfair foreign competition."
John Gibeaut,
Sherman Goes Abroad, ABA J., July 1997, at 42.
12. Frank J. Schweitzer, Flash of the Titans: A Picture of Section 301 in the
Dispute between Kodak and Fuji and a View toward DismantlingAnti-competitive
Practicesin the Japanese DistributionSystem, 11 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 847
(1996).
13. U.S. Launches Broad WTO Cases Under GA TT, GA TS Against Japan on
Film, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, June 14, 1996, at 22.
14. WTO's Kodak Ruling Heightens Trade Tensions, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8,
1997, at A3. On this "thorny issue of internal barriers" in Japan, the WTO did
not recognize the US claim under the unilateral Section 301 to "change Japan's
closed system," which have been common in many Asian countries. Thus,
besides the applicability of Section 301 on the anti-competitive foreign activities,
there are many issues, including the extraterritorial applicability of the Sherman
Act to such circumstance and the degree of international recognition (or, other
relevant legal justifications) over such "closed system" that should sufficiently
outweigh criticism or legal interests over the unilateral and extraterritorial
application of the US federal law.
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whether Kodak will choose another option, as one commentator

demonstrates that the question of extraterritorial application of
the Sherman Act can be applicable "to this extreme case-where
the complained of conduct occurs abroad and the only effects felt

in the US are intangible [denial of the foreign market access]
when compared to other cases... [where] a US exporter has lost
potential sales."15

These three examples clearly demonstrate the very nature of
this globalized world economy. A critical legal issue that this
paper will explore in this complex world context, is so-called

extraterritorial application of competition (antitrust) law. There
are certainly many relevant sub-issues even in this extraterritorial
application of competition law. In order to narrow down the
topics of this paper among the sub-issues, the following two points

should be considered. First, extraterritoriality is neither new nor
limited to competition law. It is well established in international

law that a state can also have its extraterritorial jurisdiction in five
principles in order to protect its public national interests. 16 In
addition, extraterritoriality is also very popular in many areas of
law other than competition law, such as environmental law, labor
law, investment law, bankruptcy law, etc. 7 This extraterritorial
application in almost every area of law undoubtedly results from
the rampantly globalized economy.18
Second, under this circumstance, the unilateral extraterritorial application of the law of one nation, like the Sherman
Act and the EU merger regulation, has been adopted with

frequency, convenience, and popularity despite concerns and
controversies.' 9

As shown in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v.

15. Renee Hardt, Kodak v Fuji: A Test Case for the Extraterritorial
Application of the Sherman Act, 15 B.U. INT'L L.J. 309, 312 (1997). Kodak did
not claim this issue of extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act to the
Japanese anti-competitive practices, as discussed above; Hardt only hypothesizes
what would happen if Kodak sued Fuji under the Sherman Act.
16. These public national interests are territory, nationality, protective
principle, passive personality, and universal jurisdiction. CARTER AND TRIMBLE,

725-789 (1995). For a general discussion on extraterritorial
application of the US federal laws based on the territorial doctrine, see Gary B.
Born, Appraisal of the ExtraterritorialReach of U.S. Law, 24 LAW & POL'Y INT'L
INTERNATIONAL LAW

Bus. 1 (Fall 1992).
17. These are the so-called post-Uruguay Round agendas.

18. See supra note 8.
19. This is not limited to the Sherman Act. Another example is Section 301
of the 1974 Trade Act. For comparing extraterritorial application of US antitrust
law with the Trade Act of 1974, see Aubry D. Smith, Bringing Down Private
Trade Barriers-An Assessment of the United States' Unilateral Options: Section
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California et al.20 and Ahistrom Osakeyhito et. al. v. Commission
("Wood Pulp") 2' cases, unilateral extraterritorial application of
competition law (or, antitrust law) is now the law in the US and
the EU. However, this unilateral extraterritorial application of
competition law has received many thorny criticisms.
Combining these two preliminary considerations, it is very
unpredictable where this controversial unilateral extraterritorial
application of competition law will end up. It seems unavoidable
that this unilateral extraterritoriality will be accepted. However,
to the extent that this unilateral extraterritoriality raises many
legal questions, other less controversial alternatives ought to be
sought, as the issue of extraterritorial application of antitrust law
has been sufficiently surfaced as an important issue in this era of
22
post-Uruguay Round.
C. Organizationof This Article
This paper will focus on the question of how less controversial
alternatives can be achieved. In other words, which model is more
appropriate or desirable to follow for achieving such an
international harmonization of competition law. It is true that
there is no consensus on competition law that will satisfy every
nation at this point. However, this paper does not seek to have
such a universal competition law code. Rather, it advocates the
necessity to negotiate and develop such an effort for an international competition law in this era of globalization, while
discussing the other limited alternatives.
There are three different approaches to be compared. They
are unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral approaches. The United
States and the European Union, both of the powerful entities in
the area of competition law, already had their highest courts rule
on their unilateral applications of competition laws extraterritorially. In part II, this paper explains the two famous cases in
301 of the 1974 Trade Act and ExtraterritorialApplication of U.S. Antitrust Law,
16 MIcH. J. INT'L L. 241 (Fall 1994).
20. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California et al., 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
21. 1998 E.C.R. 5193.
22. David W. Leebron, An Overview of the Uruguay Round Results, 34
COLUM. J. TRANSN'L L.11, 31-35 (1995). Since the general purpose of any
antitrust law is to regulate anti-competitive acts hindering free and fair
competition, which will eventually further free trade between countries, it is very
much related to the post World War II free trade frameworks. For a discussion
of the relationship between antitrust and trade, see Daniel J. Gifford, Antitrust
and Trade Issues: Similarities, Differences, and Relationships, 44 DEPAUL LAW
REV. 1049 (1995).
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the US and the EU. It also provides many criticisms on the
decisions and discusses the defects of this unilateral approach.
Despite the argument of regional success, the bilateral
approach is also limited. It simply means the expansion of the
unilateral approach under the name of "cooperation." However,
since bilateral effort between the US and the EU was very
significant, considering the models of each entity still remains a
possible example to substitute for the multilateral approach,
although it was, at least, partially cracked down. In part III, this
paper will provide further details on this argument.
In part IV, the multilateral approach will be introduced and
explained. The so-called "Draft in International Antitrust Code
(DIAC)" model and the GATTI/WTO model will be described.
It is true that none of these approaches is dominant in this
argument of international competition law. Nevertheless, as every
economist agrees on the advance of the era of globalization, every
competition lawyer agrees that there is a need to set forth an
international competition law. But, as every economist still argues
what globalization is, every competition lawyer also debates what
kind of competition law. Fortunately, however, we are on the
right track to achieve a consensual international competition law
in this era of globalization. Part V of this paper will be premised
on this ideological jurisprudence with my views of the argument
on the international competition law amidst this globalization.
Then, the defects of the unilateral and bilateral approaches will be
reviewed and discussed in this context. The article will especially
argue the present three possible models, unilateral, bilateral, and
multilateral approaches, which will be the substantive arguments.
Lastly, the forum argument will be discussed. In other words, th is
will provide a forum to use in this argument of international
competition law that may support the multilateral approach.
II.

Unilateral Extraterritorial Application of Competition Law

A. In the United States
1. Before Hartford Fire-Section one of the Sherman Act
provides that:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or foreign nations, is hereby declared to be
illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in
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any combination or conspiracy hereby declared illegal shall be
deemed guilty of felony and, on conviction thereof, shall be
punished by fine ...

,

or by imprisonment..., or by both said

punishment, in the discretion of the court.23
There are generally two competing theories on the topic of
extraterritorial application of US antitrust law. The one is a strict
territorial approach, also known as "vested rights" theory, as held
2 4
in the 1909 case of American Banana Co. v. United Fruit CO.
American Banana, an Alabama corporation, sought treble
damages under the Sherman Act by alleging that its banana
plantation had been confiscated and damaged by Costa Rica at the
instigation and conspiration of United Fruit, a New Jersey
corporation. 2' The court held that the Sherman Act could not
regulate the alleged monopolization scheme by reasoning that the
seized plantation was within the de facto jurisdiction of Costa Rica
26
and the injury complained of had occurred outside the US.
Justice Holmes stated: "The general and almost universal rule is
that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be
determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is
done. ,27

The opposite theory, the balance of interest approach, also
known as "intent/effects theory," was adopted in United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa).28 In Alcoa, the US government sought to challenge Alcoa's monopolization of interstate and
foreign commerce and its related conspiracy with its Canadian
subsidiary ("Limited").2 9 A quota agreement was made between
the Limited and several European corporations, together forming
an international cartel called the "Alliance."3 ° Although the
agreement was silent regarding the US market, and Alcoa was not
a member of the Alliance, the controlling group in the Limited
owned nearly forty-nine percent of Alcoa stocks.'
After citing American Banana's traditional territorial
approach "for conduct which has no consequences within the
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
(1903)).
28.
29.
30.
31.

15 U.S.C. § 1.
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
See id. at 349, 354-55.
See id. at 357-58.
Id. at 356 (quoting Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120, 126
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
Id. at 421.
Id. at 442.
See id. at 439, 442-43.
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United States, 32 Judge Learned Hand stated that "any state may
impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for
conduct outside its borders that has consequences within its
borders which the state reprehends. 33 Then, he held that the
Sherman Act would be applicable to the agreements abroad if
they were intended to, and did have, some effects on foreign trade
or commerce of the United States.34
The court in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America et
al. held that the effects test of Alcoa was incomplete because it
failed to consider other nations' interests.35 The Ninth Circuit
adopted a tripartite test to determine whether courts should
exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction: first, there must be some
effect-actual or intended-on American foreign commerce in the
alleged restraint; second, the effect must be sufficiently large to
present a cognizable injury; and finally, the court should
determine whether the interests of the United States were
sufficiently strong over those of other nations to justify an
36
assertion of extraterritorial authority.
factors for the third prong of the test.3 7 The court detailed seven
2. Hartford Fire-In Hartford Fire, the Supreme Court
considered whether the principle of international comity should
preclude the exercise of jurisdiction over British reinsurance
companies that were alleged to have conspired with American
insurance companies to limit certain forms of insurance coverage.
32. Id. at 443.
33. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443.
34. See id. at 444.
35. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America et al., 549 F.2d 507, 612.
36. See id. 613.
37. See id. at 614. The seven factors are: (1) the degree of conflict with
foreign law or policy; (2) the nationality or allegiance of the parties and the
locations or principal places of business of corporations; (3) the extent to which
enforcement by either state can be expected to achieve compliance; (4) the
relative significance of effects on the United States as compared with those
elsewhere; (5) the extent to which there is an explicit purpose to harm or affect
American commerce; (6) the foreseeability of such effect; and (7) the relative
importance to the violations charged of conduct within the United States are
compared with conduct abroad. Id. Another court provides 10 factors in
considering the reasonableness of exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction. Three
factors are added to the seven Timberlane factors. The additional three factors
are: whether the court can make its order effective; whether an order for relief
would be acceptable in this country if made by the foreign nation under similar
circumstances; whether a treaty with the affected nations has addressed this issue.
Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297-98 (3d Cir.
1979).
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The Court upheld the extraterritorial jurisdiction of US courts
over foreign or multinational corporations that violated US
antitrust law while operating in the US market without
considering the interests of the foreign sovereign nation.
The Court ruled that the jurisdictional requirement of the
first prong was satisfied by stating that: "Although the proposition is not always free from doubt," the Sherman Act applies to
foreign conduct that was meant to produce and did in fact produce
some substantial effects in the United States."39

As for the second prong of the comity test, Justice Souter
noted that when enacting the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act of 1982 ("FTAIA"), "Congress expressed no view on
the question whether a court with the Sherman Act jurisdiction
should ever decline to exercise such jurisdiction on the grounds of
international comity." 4 But, under Justice Souter's international
comity analysis, "the only substantial question in this case is
'whether there is in fact a true conflict between domestic and
foreign law."'' 4' The Court stated that: " '[T]he fact that conduct is
lawful in the state in which it took place will not, of itself, bar
application of the United States antitrust laws,' even where the
foreign state has a strong policy to permit or encourage such
conduct., 42 He further wrote that: "no conflict exists 'where a
person subject to regulation by two states can comply with the
laws of the both.' ,43 That is, Justice Souter seemed to find such a
true conflict only where there was a direct conflict between
domestic and foreign laws. Therefore, he held that: "Since the
London reinsurers do not argue that British law requires them to
act in some fashion prohibited by the law of the United States, or
claim that their compliance with the laws of both countries is

38. Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 795-6 citing American Banana.
39. Id. at 796. Although this opinion tries to answer for the jurisdiction
prong, it is unclear whether it affirms the intent/effects test of Alcoa or the direct,
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable test of Timberlane and the Restatement.
See Penny Zagalis, Hartford Fire Insurance Company v. California:Reassessing
the Application of the McCarran-Ferguson Act to Foreign Reinsurers, 27
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 241, 249-56, 259-60 (1994). Nevertheless, as Justice Souter
also noted, this jurisdiction prong was adopted by the Supreme Court in
Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 582 n.6
(1986). In this sense, the jurisdiction prong seems less controversial than the
comity prong.
40. Hartford Fire,509 U.S at 798.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 799, quoting Restatement § 415, cmt. j.
43. Id. quoting Restatement § 403. cmt. e.

314

DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 18:2

otherwise impossible,.., we have no need in this case to address
other considerations that might inform a decision to refrain from
the exercise
of jurisdiction on the grounds of international
4
comity."
In his dissent, Justice Scalia argued that "under the
Restatement, a nation having 'some basis' for jurisdiction to
prescribe law should nonetheless refrain from exercising 'with
respect to a person or activity having connections with another
state when the exercise of such jurisdiction would be
unreasonable.' ,4' After mentioning the factors in the Restatement, he further stated that: "Rarely would these factors point
more clearly against application of the United States law...
[Therefore, it is] unimaginable that an assertion of legislative
jurisdiction by the United States would be considered reasonable,
and therefore it is inap4 ropriate to assume that Congress has
made such an assertion."

v

Justice Scalia contended that the majority's no true conflict
analysis 47 would be "breathtakingly broad" and would "bring the
Sherman Act into sharp and unnecessary conflict with legitimate
interests of other countries -particularly
our closest trading
48
partners.,
He further stated that the majority misinterpreted
Comment e to § 403 of the Restatement 49 by skipping subsection
(3)5 o of § 403 "on the authority of Comment j5 1 to 415 of the
Restatement."5 2 He reasoned that: "subsection (3) of 403 comes
44. Id.
45. Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 818.
46. Id. at 819.
47. The majority concludes that "no 'true conflict' counseling nonapplication
of the United States law (or rather, as it thinks, the United States judicial
jurisdiction) exists unless compliance with the United States law would constitute
a violation of another country's law." Id. at 820.
48. Id.
49. Id. supra note 42. Comment e more precisely reads: "Subsection (3)
applies only when one state requires what another prohibits, or where
compliance with the regulations of two states exercising jurisdiction consistently
with this section is otherwise impossible. It does not apply 'where a person
subject to regulation by two states can comply with the laws of the both,'. .
Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 821, citing Restatement § 403, cmt. e.
50. "A state should defer to another state if that state's interest is clearly
greater." Id., citing Restatement § 403 (3).
51. Id at 799, citing Restatement § 415, cmt. j.
52. Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 821, n.11. Justice Scalia stated that: Comment
to § 415 "makes clear that '[a]ny exercise of [legislative] jurisdiction under this
section is subject to the requirement of reasonableness' set forth in § 403 (2)."
Id., citing § 415, cmt. a. However, after characterizing Justice Scalia's contention
as "putting the cart before the horse," Justice Souter stated, "whatever the order
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into play only after subsection (1)"3 of 403 has been complied

with.

54

3.

After HARTFORD FIRE

a.
Criticism of Hartford Fire-After discussing the
precedent cases before Hartford Fire, one commentator, Penny

Zagalis, agrees with the majority's conclusion on the question of
whether international comity should limit the extraterritorial
application of the US antitrust law.55 However, she contends that
Hartford Fire failed to determine three important legal issues: (1)
whether the direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effects
test of the FTAIA amends the effects test of Alcoa; (2) whether

judges have authority to decline jurisdiction due to comity
consideration; (3) whether the comity balancing test should be
applied only after the jurisdiction has been established. Zagalis
concludes that the Supreme Court failed to formulate a clear legal
standard for lower courts to follow, and that it should have

rejected the comity test in favor of the pure effects test for
determining jurisdiction because the majority's test is highly
discretionary and unpredictable. 57
Professor McGuire agrees with Justice Souter's decision, by

reasoning that state law cannot deal with huge multinational
insurers in an effective manner in order to protect consumers and
states because they are "too large, too complex, and too
powerful."58 However, he does not discuss and give details on the

comity question. He merely seems to determine that necessity or
of cart and horse, conflict in this sense is the only substantial issue before the
Court." Id. at 799, n.25.
53. Subsection one says that "a nation having some 'basis' for jurisdiction to
prescribe law should nonetheless refrain from exercising that jurisdiction 'with
respect to a person or activity having connections with another state when the
exercise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable' " Hartford Fire, at 818, citing
Restatement § 403 (1).
54. Id. at 821.
55. Zagalis, supra note 39, at 249-56, 259-60.
56. See id. at 266.
57. See id. at 268-69. Despite such unanswered legal questions, I do not
think the Court intended to adopt the pure effects test such as in Alcoa, simply
because the Court also tried to provide conditions, which the Court called "true
conflict," before applying the international comity prong. While the Court did
not clearly abandon this comity prong, most opposing opinions argue on the
basis of Justice Souter's definition of true conflict.
58. Charles R. McGuire, Regulation of the InsuranceIndustry after Hartford
Fire Insurance v. California: The McCarran-FergusonAct and Antitrust Policies,
25 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 303, 355 (1994).
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the interest in protecting domestic consumers outweighs that of
huge foreign insurers.
Burr contends that the result of the decision was necessary
although the reasoning would be questionable. 59 He argues that
Justice Souter's definition of true conflict was too narrow and
would rarely be found.6° Thus, until clear guidelines are addressed
either by court or by Congress, he provides three categories based
upon the degree of impact the challenged conduct has on US
61
commerce.
Burr's test says that first, the court should not apply US
antitrust law extraterritorially in cases where the challenged
conduct has virtually no or a de minimus effect on US commerce. 61
Second, the court should apply the law regardless of the outcome
under an interest balancing analysis in cases where the challenged
conduct has a "direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable"
effect. 6' Finally, the court should take an interest balancing
analysis and apply the law if relevant factors favor the United
States in cases where the challenged conduct has more than a
"minimal" but less than a "substantial" effect. 64 His three
categories are praiseworthy, especially considering that neither the
HartfordFire Court nor the 1995 Guideline by the DOJ provided
a clear test for the lower courts to follow.
Gupta argues that the Hartford Fire decision can be justified
under principles other than comity. 66 He contends that the US
interests in international comity can be protected under principles
such as the "intended effects" test and the doctrine of personal
jurisdiction, foreign sovereign immunity, act of state, and foreign
sovereign compulsion, since he believes that economic and
political situations under which the Timberlane comity analysis
was made have changed dramatically.67

59. Scott A. Burr, The Application of U.S. Antitrust Law to Foreign Conduct:
Has Hartford Fire Extinguished Considerations of Comity?, 15 U. PA. J. INT'L
Bus. L. 221, 257 (1994).
60. See id. at 244.
61. See id. at 256.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Burr, supra note 59, at 256.
65. United States Department of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm'n, Antitrust
Enforcement Guidelines for International Operation § 3.2 (1995).
66. Varun Gupta, After Hartford Fire: Antitrust and Comity, 84 GEo. L.J.
2287 (June 1996).
67. See id. at 2288-89, 2305-18.
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Gupta asserts that the US Supreme Court had an essential
role in preserving free and fair competition in the US, which Was a
"unique American phenomenon," while most foreign countries
considered industrial concentration "a means for strengthening
the national economies., 68 For political reasons, on the other
hand, he argues that "in a divided world with Cold War... the US
interest in preserving good international relations with its trading
partners was paramount. [Therefore,] It was reasonable and
necessary for courts to discount the economic interests of private
US litigants when faced with the prospect of disruptions in the
never ending task of the executive to keep free nations aligned
with the American block., 69 In consideration of those reasons, he
argues that Timberlane was correct in adopting the comity
analysis. °
However, since such economic and political reasons are now
absent, or at least weakened, Gupta argues that Timberlane is no
longer necessary and appropriate. That is, many countries such as
the European Community (EC) and international organizations
such as the WTO, the EU, and the North American Free Trade
Association (NAFTA) "have further encouraged diverse nations
to abandon their parochial concerns for favored domestic
industries and submit to the international order that allocates
industries to nations according to theories of comparative
advantage." 71 He also provides the end of bipolar Cold War for
72
the political reason.
There are many opposing opinions, for various reasons. One
extremist calls it "Yankee's 'jurisdictional jingoism.""'" However,
the opponents generally agree with Justice Scalia's call for
avoiding "unnecessary conflict with legitimate interest of other
countries., 74 Pelini argues that Justice Souter's true conflict test
was so narrow as to eliminate the international comity
68. Id. at 2307.
69. Id. at 2308.
70. See id.
71. Gupta, supra note 66 at 2309. He also disregards other nations argument
that "the extraterritoriality permits the US to unjustifiably 'mold the
international economic and trading world in its own image.' "Id.
72. See id. at 2311.
73. John B. Sandage, Forum Non Conveniens and the Extraterritorial
Application of United States Antitrust Law, 94 YALE L. J. 1693, 1698 (1985).
Although this article was published before Hartford Fire, this extreme call can be
understandable when Hartford Fire implicitly adopted the Alcoa's intent/effects
test.
74. Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 820.
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consideration from the extraterritoriality analysis which "severely
harms US diplomatic relationship.""
Reuland contends that
prohibition of the comity analysis "invites further disruption in
international relations over extraterritorial exercise of United

States jurisdiction.""

Highet also contends that the majority

opinion should have considered comity. 77 He argues that "the

majority opinion not only fails to analyze the factors of
'reasonableness' other than the narrowly defined 'conflict of law'

principle but also fails to consider the possible difference in
conflict-of-law analysis arising from
the fact the plaintiffs [in
78
HartfordFire] are private suitors.

On the other hand, Professor Dam argues that the comity
analysis should be a policy choice since the Sherman Act does not

specify its extraterritorial reach and the Supreme Court cases do
not provide a conclusive answer.79 While he advocates that the
comity analysis should be workable especially in private treble
damage actions where foreign policy considerations play no role in

the private decision to bring the action, Professor Dam also
provides another alternative to accept 'Justice Scalia's canon of

statutory construction'8 ° as an international law limitation on the
Sherman Act.8
Cotter also argues, besides the narrowness of the true
conflict test, that the majority opinion has caused US trading
partners to enact "blocking statues," due to aggressive behavior by

75. Mary C. Pelini, The ExtraterritorialJurisdiction Analysis in Light of
Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California: How PeripheralHas the International
Comity Notion Become?, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 477, 490 (1994).
76. Robert C. Reuland, Hartford Fire Insurance Co., Comity, and
ExtraterritorialReach of United States Antitrust Laws, 29 TEX. INT'L L.J. 159, 208
(1994).
77. Keith Highet et. al., International Decision, 88 AM. J. INT'L L.109, 114
(1994).
78. Id.
79. Kenneth W. Dam, Extraterritorialityin an Age of Globalization: The
Hartford Fire Case, 1993 Sup. CT.REv. 289, 321.
80. "An act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of
nations if any other possible construction remains ... Though it clearly has
constitutional authority to do so, Congress is generally presumed not to have
exceeded those customary international-law limits on jurisdiction to proscribe."
Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 818.
81. See Kenneth W. Dam, 1993 Sup. CT. REV. 289, 326-28.
82. Jeffrey L. Cotter, ExtraterritorialJurisdiction: The Application of U.S.
Antitrust Laws to Acts Outside the United States-HartfordFire Insurance Co. v.
California, 113 S. Ct. 2891 (1993), 20 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1109, 1132-41
(1994).
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US plaintiffs.83 In addition, he contends that the majority opinion
fails to provide a clear test for the courts to follow and it should
have developed an international comity test based on the
Timberlane case.4
Rhatican15 contends that Justice Souter's approval of
extensive international antitrust enforcement could make the
United States a "commercial pariah" in the area of world trade.86
He warns that the effects test can be regarded as a form of
"judicial imperialism" if the US continues to enforce extraterritorial application of its antitrust law for the purpose of
protecting American interests abroad." Instead, he contends that
the US, as a "commercial police officer," should consider comity
since there is "neither consensus on the treatment of antitrust law,
set of international rules of prescriptive
nor a prevailing
88
jurisdiction.
He explains that such an extraterritorial application of US
antitrust law could be unpersuasive. First, such an unusually
powerful and independent punitive sanctions remedy in the US
antitrust law, treble damages, is alien to most US trading partners,
thus causing them to enact "claw-back" provisions in the blocking
Second, he argues that most nations only have
statutes."
"fledgling" antitrust laws while "the US antitrust law are far more
pro-competitive than those that exist in other nations." 9 Thus, he
is concerned that the US may run the risk of alienating foreign
trading partners, as Justice Scalia warned.
b.

1995 Guideline-After Hartford Fire, the DOJ, in

conjunction with the Federal Trade Commission, issued a set of
guidelines in 1995.91 However, the 1995 Guidelines also follow the
true conflict test in Hartford Fire by stating that "no conflict exists
for purposes of an international comity analysis in the courts if the
person subject to regulation by two states can comply with the
laws of both." 92 The 1995 Guidelines provide two cases where
there can be no existence of true conflict: (1) "there may be "no
83. Id. at 1133-34.
84. See id. at 1135-41.
85. James P. Rhatican, Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California:A Mixed
Blessingfor InsuranceAntitrust Defendants, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 905, 955 (1995).
86. Id. at 955-56.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 956.
89. Id. at 957.
90. Rhatican, supra note 85, at 957.
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actual conflict' between the antitrust enforcement interests of the
United States and the laws or policies of a foreign sovereign,
[because] more countries [increasingly] adopt antitrust or
competition laws that are 'compatible with' those of the US;93 (2)
if the laws or policies of a foreign nation are 'neutral,'9 4 it is again
possible for the parties in question to95 comply with the US
prohibition without violating foreign law.,
B. In the European Union
1. Competition Law in General-The most important
European competition law rules are found in Article 85 and 86 of
the Treaty of Rome, or the "EC Treaty," the Treaty Establishing
the European Community, formerly known as the "European
Economic Community" or the "EEC Treaty., 96 While Article 85
regulates agreements between businesses, Article 86 prohibits
abuses of dominant position. 97
The European Community
competition law has three distinctive features: (1) "Community
91. See United States Department of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm'n,
Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operation § 3.2 (1995). The
1995 Guidelines retreat from the earlier position in favor of a Timberlane
analysis, despite implicit rejection of Timberlane comity prong in Hartford Fire.
The relevant factors, provided by the DOJ in the 1995 Guidelines, include: "(1)
the relative significance to the alleged violation of conduct within the United
States, as compared to conduct abroad; (2) the nationality of the persons
involved in or affected by the conduct; (3) the presence or absence of a purpose
to affect US consumers, markets, or exporters; (4) the relative significance and
foreseeability of the effects of the conduct on the United States as compared to
the effects abroad; (5) the existence of reasonable expectations that would be
furthered or defeated by the action; (6) the degree of conflict with foreign law or
articulated foreign economic policies; (7) the effect on foreign enforcement; and
(8) the effectiveness of foreign enforcement." Id. Thus, the 1995 Guidelines
note that "in disputes between private parties, many courts are willing to
undertake a comity analysis," although the purpose of the Guideline is to guide
the DOJ for its prosecutorial discretion. Id.
92. Id.
93. However, this statement is unclear whether: (1) many countries are
sufficiently following the US antitrust law; (2) the model to follow should be the
US antitrust law; (3) if they are following the US antitrust law, their competition
laws are compatible with the US antitrust law.
94. This is also vague. Perhaps Burr's three categories are more useful.
95. United States Department of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm'n, supra note
91.
96. See Stephen Johnson, EU Competition Law at 341, in RALPH H. FOLSOM,
RALPH B. LAKE, VED. P. NANDA, EDS., EUROPEAN UNION LAW AFTER
MAASTRICHT:

A

MARKET (1996).

97.

See id.

PRACTICAL

GUIDE FOR LAWYERS OUTSIDE THE COMMON
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competition law aims at ensuring that the Common Market works
effectively; (2) Article 85 has been built into a procedure for
declaring inapplicable the Article's prohibitions against agreements which restrict competition where certain efficiency and
consumer benefits arise; (3) Community analysis is somewhat less
driven by hard economic 98theories than analysis found in the US
decisions in recent years.
The Commission, the administrative body of the EU, has the
primary power of applying and enforcing the competition rules
under the Council Regulation 17 procedure.99 It also has exclusive
power in granting exemptions under Article 85 (3). As mentioned
above, while Article 85 (1) prohibits agreements that may affect
trade between Member States, such anticompetitive agreements
may be brought to the Commission to apply for exemption under
Article 85 (3) or "negative clearance." Negative clearance is a
determination that Article 85 (1) or Article 86 does not apply.' °°
Alternatively, the Commission may issue a "comfort letter," which
means that the Commission does find any necessity for action with
regard to the notified agreement under the circumstances. °' The
work of the Commission in applying and enforcing the
competition rules is supervised by the Court of Fist Instance (CFI)
and the Court of Justice (ECJ).'02 All decisions taken by the
Commission can be challenged in the CFI, and
further appeals are
10 3
in turn subject to judicial review of the ECJ.
2. Dyestuffs Case-Although the basic competition rules
are established in Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty, it does not
explicitly describe its jurisdictional limit. European evolution on
this issue of extraterritoriality is similar to that of the US.
In

Imperial Chemical Industrial Ltd.

v.

Commission

("Dyestuffs"), the ECJ neither accepted traditional law principles
of sovereignty nor applied the so-called "effects doctrine" to this
thorny issue of extraterritoriality.' °4 Instead, it adopted the
economic unit doctrine. The Imperial Chemical Industrial Ltd.
("ICI"), a U.K. firm then outside the Community, was charged
with the dyestuffs cartel by the Commission which imposed fines
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id.
See id. at 343.
Id. at 345.
Johnson, supra note 96, at 346.
Id. at 349.
See id.
1972 E.C.R. 619.
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on ICI. ICI contended that the Commission was not empowered
to impose fines on it under the international law principle of
sovereignty and under the Treaty itself. When the Commission
rejected ICI's contention under the effects theory, the ICI sued
the Commission for annulment.
The Court determined that decision on the extraterritorial
issue was unnecessary because a subsidiary of the ICI was located
within the Community. The Court further determined that the
jurisdiction over the ICI's alleged antitrust conduct was
appropriate through the control of its subsidiary in the
Community because "the applicant was able to exercise decisive
influence over the policy of the subsidiaries as regards selling
prices in the Common Market and in fact used this power upon
the occasion of the three price increase in question."' '
3. Wood Pulp Case-The two doctrines were not in
confrontation because the results from them were "exactly the
same."' 1 6 However, this peaceful coexistence was no longer
possible when a case arose "in which the economic unit theory, for
its elasticity, could not be stretched to cover truly 'non-European'
actors, whose actions outside the Community affect EC
competition. "107

In the Wood Pulp case, the Commission charged many nonEuropean firms with price-fixing of wood pulp sold to buyers in
the Community under Article 85 of the Treaty. Finding that the
Community had been affected by such alleged conduct, the
Commission concluded that: "The effect of the agreements and
practices on prices announced and/or charged to customers and on
resale of pulp within the EEC was therefore not only substantial
but intended, and was primary and direct result of the agreements
and practices.

'1 9
w

On the question of extraterritoriality, the Court stated that:
"[A]n infringement of Article 85, such as the conclusion of an
agreement which has had the effect of restricting competition
within the common market, consists of conduct made up of two
elements, the formation of the agreement, decision or concerted
105. Id.
106. James J. Freidberg, The Convergence of Law in an Era of Political
Integration: the Wood Pulp Case and the Alcoa Effects Doctrine, 52 U. Pir. L.
REv. 289, 318 (Winter 1991).
107. Id.
108. 1988 E.C.R. 5193.
109. Id. at 5232.
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practice and the implementation thereof.... The decisive factor is
therefore the place where [the agreement] is implemented." 0'°
The Court further determined that: "The producers in this case
implemented their pricing agreement within the common market.
It is immaterial in that respect whether or not they had recourse to
subsidiaries, agents, sub-agents, or branches within the
Community in order to make their contracts with purchasers
within the Community."'" The Court did not explicity accept the
Commission's effects doctrine.
One commentator calls it a
"modified effects doctrine.' 112
On the issue of international comity, the Court took a
controversial position. The Court stated that it would be
unnecessary to consider international comity, because "it suffices
to observe that it amounts to calling in question the Community's
jurisdiction to apply its competition rules to conduct such as that
found to exist in this case and that, as such, that argument has
already been rejected."'"3 One commentator argues that: "the
Court's cursory treatment of international comity in its
jurisdictional inquiry also gives cause for concern," because it
apparently rejected the second prong
of the jurisdictional rule of
114
reason set forth by the US courts.
C. Defenses and Defects

Now that the Wood Pulp cases in the EU and HartfordFire in
the US are the laws in each jurisdiction, they should govern the
question of extraterritorial application of competition law. The
highest court in each jurisdiction clearly did not accept the comity
prong in applying the competition rule extraterritorially. As
discussed before, however, this disregard or cursory treatment of
comity has invoked many criticisms in both countries."' It is
interesting to note that the Wood Pulp case first rejected the
comity prong, which may also have caused the disregard of comity
in HartfordFire.

110. Id. at 5243.
111. Id.
112. Freidberg, supra note 106, at 321.
113. 1988 E.C.R. 5193, 5244.
114. Roger P. Alford, The ExtraterritorialApplication of Antitrust Laws: The
United States and European Community Approaches, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 37
(Fall 1992).
115. See section A.3 of part II in this article.
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While there is no international consensus on the issue of
extraterritorial application of competition law, the responses
outside the US, since the Hartford Fire decision, have been
seeking retaliation or at least disharmony.1 16 This may lead both
the US and the EU to a dilemma arising from such an unappealing
extraterritorial application of competition law. Therefore, while
the US is seeking to enforce its antitrust law as a desirable model
for the rest of the world to follow by the Hartford Fire decision,
another effort to achieve an international competition law in order
to lessen the controversial nature of the extraterritorial
application question has been alternatively or simultaneously
sought and discussed.
III. Bilateral Approach
A.

Introduction

The bilateral approach emphasizes cooperation based on
regionalism and functionalism."' But, it seems the expansion of
the unilateral approach, particularly considering the limited
success of the bilateral approach. " ' Despite many other regional
success examples,' 9 the United States-European Union Agreement contains its symbolic importance in the bilateral approach
argument. Thus, this paper will focus on the Agreement.
B.

The United States-European Union Agreement

The US Government and the European Commission
("Parties") signed an agreement regarding the application of their
competition laws ("Agreement") on September 23, 1991,
"recognizing
that the world's economies are becoming
increasingly interrelated,... ; noting that [the Parties] share the
view that the sound and effective enforcement of competition law
is a matter of importance to the efficient operation of their
respective markets and trade between them; noting that the sound
and effective enforcement of the Parties' competition laws would
be enhanced by cooperation and, in appropriate cases,

116.
117.

An example of this is a claw-back provision in the blocking statutes.
See Spencer Weber Waller, The Internationalization of Antitrust

Enforcement, 77 B.U.L. REV. 343, 352-74 (Apr. 1997); Diane P. Wood, The
Impossible Dream: Real InternationalAntitrust, 1992 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 277, 28897.
118.

See generally part V, especially section D, of this article.

119.

See Waller, supra note 117, at 352-74.
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coordination between them in the application of those laws; noting
further that from time to time differences may arise between the
Parties concerning the application of their competition laws to
transactions that implicate significant interests of both
conduct or
2
parties." 1 0
The purpose of the Agreement was "to promote cooperation
and coordination and lessen the possibility or impact of
differences between the Parties in the application of their
competition laws."' 2 Items of major importance in the Agreement include information exchange, cooperation, comity, and
confidentiality of information. Parties agreed to notify each other
whenever their respective competition authorities became aware
that "their enforcement activities may affect important interests of
the other party. 1 22 They also agreed to exchange all relevant
information on a regular basis in furtherance of better understanding of their respective competition law."' Article VI
provided for the traditional negative comity, by agreeing that the
Parties would "consider important interests of the other Party in
decisions as to whether or not to initiate an investigation or
proceeding, the scope of an investigation or proceeding, the
remedies or penalties sought, and in other ways, as
nature of the '124

appropriate."

Positive comity and confidentiality of information are among
the most arguable and significant aspects of the Agreement.
Besides this negative form of comity, Article V provided the
concept of positive comity: "If a Party believes that anticompetitive activities carried out on the territory of the other
Party are adversely affecting its important interests, the first Party
may notify the other Party and may request that the other Party's
competition authorities initiate appropriate enforcement
activities. ' ,1 2 In contrast with these comity provisions, "neither
Party is required to provide information to the other Party if
disclosure of that information to the other requesting Party (a) is
prohibited by the law of the Party possessing the information, or
(b) would be incompatible with important interests of the Party
120. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America
and the Commission of the European Committees Regarding the Application of
Their Competition Laws, Sept. 23, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1487 (1991).
121. Id. at Article 1(1).
122. Id. at Article 11 (1).
123. Id. at Article III.
124. Id. at Article VI.
125. Agreement, supra note 120, at Article V (2).
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possessing the information."'' 26 Therefore, questions may arise
about how to construe these conflicting provisions.
C.

Strengths and Defecets
In contrast to the unilateral approach, the bilateral approach

is less controversial and regionally successful.'

However, as long

as the two most influential entities, the United States and the
European Union, are in competition to gain a "hegemony,"'' 28 the
regional success tends to be limited. Therefore, it is very significant whether the US and the EU can cooperate and avoid
conflicts in applying their competition laws. Unfortunately,
however, thus far despite Judge Wood's eulogies,'29 the results
have been retaliation, or at least disharmony, as seen in Wood
Pulp and HartfordFire.

Although it is evident that the Agreement may contribute in
promoting mutual understanding of the differences between the
US and EU's competition laws, the Agreement remained
questionable by containing conflicting provisions, especially
between positive comity and confidentiality of information.
In this context, it is interesting to review some major cases
determined after the Agreement on the basis of this conflicting
relationship between positive comity and confidentiality of
information. There are two important cases after the Agreement
in the US and the EU. First, as discussed before, Justice Souther's
decision in Hartford Fire that there would be no comity concern
when there is no true conflict between domestic and foreign laws
invoked many criticisms. Besides the argument on the rationale of
the decision, it is apparently contrary to the purpose of the
Agreement. That is, a critical key role of the comity provision in
the Agreement was disregarded by the US Supreme Court.
The response from the EU came one year after the Hartford
Fire decision. France questioned the validity of the Agreement on

126. Id. at Article VIII.
127. See Waller, supra note 117, at 352-74. See also Wood, supra note 117, at
288-97. Judge Wood also reviews and criticizes the unilateral approach. See id.
at 297-303.
128. Hegemony can be defined as a situation where "one state is powerful
enough to maintain the essential rules governing interstate relations, and willing
do so."
ROBERT 0.
KEOHANE
INTERDEPENDENCE (2d ed. 1989).
to

&

JOSEPH

NYE,

POWER

AND

129. Her admiration of the Agreement was demonstrated by her use of the
words of "unprecedented" and "breakthrough." Wood, supra note 117 at 295-97.
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the basis of article 228 of the EC Treaty.'3 Under this article,
France argued that the Agreement failed to meet the procedural
requirements because the agreement between the EU and foreign
states could be concluded by the Council, not the Commission,
after consulting the European Parliament. 3' The ECJ determined
that the Commission
had
exceeded its power and subsequently
132
A
voided the Agreement.
IV. Multilateral Approach
A. Introduction
The question of extraterritoriality of competition law may not
arise if: there is no true conflict between the laws of the parties
involved, as held in Hartford Fire; the US and the EU may
sufficiently and cautiously consider international comity;"' or
there is an international competition law. 3 4 International competition law effort'35 is not a new idea. Many failed efforts have
been made since the end of World War II to establish such a
supranational law to integrate the national antitrust laws of each
country.136
Therefore, in combination with the extraterritoriality of
competition law and the failure of the international competition
law effort, some questions may arise.
First, if the extraterritoriality of competition law is to be continued, despite many
criticisms (since it is now the law in at least the US and the EU as
a result of Hartford Fire and Wood Pulp), should we still need an
international competition law effort despite previous failures?
Second, if we should, how can we achieve such an ambitious goal?
Third, what (country's) model should we follow?

130. See Case 327/91, French Republic v. Commission, 1994 E.C.R. 3641.
131. See EEC Treaty, Article 228 (1).
132. See Case 327/91, supra note 130 at 3678.
133. See Wood, supra note 117 at 297-303. See also Justice Scalia's dissenting
opinion in HartfordFire.
134. In this respect, both extraterritoriality of the Sherman Act and
international antitrust law effort are related.
135. Some scholars call it "international harmonization of competition law."
See Spencer Weber Waller, Neo-Realism and the InternationalHarmonizationof
Law: Lessons from Antitrust, 42 U. KAN. L. REv. 557 (1994).
136. For discussion of five unsuccessful attempts for such an effort, see Waller
supra note 117 at 349-52; Wood, supranote 117, at 281-88.
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B. A Brief History of InternationalCompetition Law Effort
Since the end of World War II, many attempts have been
made to achieve an international competition law.
Five
unsuccessful attempts were made by the League of Nations, the
proposed International Trade Organization (ITO) or the "Havana
Charter," the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations,
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD), and the United 37Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD).1
The reasons for failure can be attributed to the fact that the
nations did not •have
sufficient necessities to have an international
138
competition law.
In addition, it was impossible to reach the
objectives of such an effort. 3 9 Professor Waller thus concludes
1 40
that it failed because of "barren texts" and "false uniformity."
C.

GA TT/WTO Model

According to Professor Petersmann, there are three
approaches in international competition law problems. 14 ' They
are: the intellectual property law approach, 142 the competition law
approach,' 43 and the trade law approach.' 44 Under the trade law
approach, he advocates the integration of trade and competition

137. See id.
138. For example, in the case of League of Nations, the ITO. That is perhaps
why the following efforts of the OECD and the UNCTAD were just hortatory
and non-binding. Id.
139. For example, in the UNCTAD the developed and the developing never
agreed to compatible objectives between them. Id.
140. Waller, supra note 117 at 404.
141. Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann, International Competition Rules for
Governments and for Private Business: A "Trade Law Approach" for Linking
Trade and Competition Rules in the WTO, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 545, 546 (1996).
142. This approach focuses on " 'effective protection against unfair
competition' without providing for international antitrust rules to protect
freedom of competition." Id. at 545.
143. This approach "relies essentially on the extraterritorial application of
domestic competition laws (notably of the US and EC) to anticompetitive
practices abroad and on legally nonbinding multilateral guidelines (e.g., the 1980
UNCTAD Guidelines and 1986 OECD Guidelines) and a few bilateral
agreements for the coordination of domestic competition laws." Id.
144. This approach (notably EC law) "integrates trade and competition rules
so as to protect international market competition and cross-border transactions
against both governmental market access barriers (e.g., in favor of public
undertakings and enterprises with privileged positions) and private distortions
(e.g., in the case of trade-restricting patent misuse and anticompetitive licensing
agreements)." Id.
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rules in the WTO and "linking negotiation" on the post-Uruguay
Round agendas,45 including competition, environmental, and
investment laws.1
Professor
Petersmann also
recognizes
the divergence by
counriesin
teircomptitin
"
146
countries in their competition laws.
However, he also raises the
possibility of "governmental intervention
to correct
147 failures"
suboptimal results besides market failures.
Therefore, he argues
that competition law "also requires rules on competition among
government, similar to antitrust rules on competition among
firms."'148 In addition, he also appears to contend that because the
competition regulations contain such a public/governmental factor
that may cause international "external effects," it should be
discussed multilaterally in the GATT and the WTO (the already
prepared and established forum), as an way to protect
international "public goods.' ' 49 Professor Fox contends that this
may be called the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Antitrust Measures, or TRAMS"5
D. InternationalAntitrust Code Model
The International Antitrust Code Working Group, or socalled "Munich Group,"("The Group") strongly advocated
antitrust harmonization by presenting its "Draft in International
Antitrust Code (DIAC, or the "Draft")" to the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) in 1993.'
1. Purpose and Reasons-The Group recognizes an
uncertain new world order, the so-called globalization, which
resulted from the end of the bipolar system since the breakdown

145. Id. at 546, 574-82. See also Mitsuo Matsushita, Competition Law and
Policy in the Context of the WTO System, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1097 (1995).
146. See Petersmann, supra note 141, at 553-54. However, he contends to
bring the international competition law argument in the WTO in contrast with
the "impossible dream" argument of Judge Wood.
147. Id. at 554.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 554-65.
He also provides necessity for additional WTO
competition rules by providing legal, political, and economic reasons.
Petersmann, supra note 141, at 565-68.
150. Eleanor M. Fox, Toward World Antitrust and Market Access, 91 AM. J.
INT'L L. 1, 2 (Jan. 1997).
151. International Antitrust Code Working Group, Draft International Code
as a GATT-MTO-Plurilateral Trade Agreement, July 10, 1993, reprinted in 64
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1628, S-1 (Aug. 19, 1993)
(hereinafter referred to as the "DIAC").
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of the Berlin Wall as the beginning point for the International
Antitrust Code (IAC). It contends that "[the GAT-] does notamong other deficiencies -contain international competition rules
that can be enforced through domestic courts so as to prevent that
the opening of markets, resulting from the liberalization of
governmental trade restriction5 2is nullified or impaired by private
restrictive business practices."'
Second, since such private restraints have often been "beyond
the reach of even consensus principles of antitrust law,... an

international regime could ensure enforcement and thus open up
world markets."' Third, an international regime should assure
that "consensus wrongs" among private restraints are no longer
escapable merely because they are beyond the jurisdictional
reach. 5 4 Fourth, by setting forth certain common standards in this
globalized economy, the disharmonies can be reduced.' 55 Fifth,
such a global regime or forum "should be in a position to give
regards to all of the impacts of a transaction or behavior from the
point of view of the citizen of the world."'5 6 Finally, the process of
developing such an international code should be consciously
expanded beyond Europe. 57
2. Five Principles"'
a.

Application of Substantive National Law -It is very

important to note that the Group did not aim for an "Esperanto
antitrust law."'

59

Instead, substantive national law can be applied

for the solution of international cases.' 60 The Group contends
that: "Law can deal with international problems in various ways.
The most radical, however often impractical, way is an international agreement or treaty on a uniform (or at least
harmonized) law. The least radical way leaves the legal solution
of international issues to national law, with its limits of
impermissible extraterritoriality, eventually mitigated by a
classical conflict of law approach. This Draft does not follow
152. Id. at section I of Introduction.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See id.
156. DIAC, supra note 151, at section 1 of Introduction.
157. See id.
158. The Group contends that the three principles of a, b, and c in the
following are "Convention" principles that were already adopted in the Paris
Convention of 1883 and the Berne Convention of 1886. Id.
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either one of these models, the first appearing too ambitious, the
second to ineffective.''
b.
National Treatment-The second principle of
national treatment states that national competition law should
treat foreigners and nationals without discrimination in its
application. The Draft states that this national treatment principle
should be regarded 6as "duties" of conduct.6 2 The GATT also
adopts this principle. 1
c.
Minimum Standards-This principle means that
there should be an international minimum standard in the Draft as
a guideline for establishing an international competition rule. One
of the members in the Group contends that the new term for
minimum standards is the "consensus wrongs," which means,
"antitrust offenses to which everybody can be reasonably expected
to be opposed."' 64
d.
International Procedural Initiatives-The Group
adopts a new procedural principle to be taken by an international
body such as the GATT or the WTO instead of self-execution
principle as a fourth rule.
This principle can be166 called a
principle of International Procedural Initiatives ("IPI").
The Group also contends that this initiative is similar to the
positive comity principle as in the example of the US-EU
Agreement on antitrust cooperation. 167 Article 19 section 2
provides that the International Antitrust Authority should have:
"(a) a right to ask for actions in individual cases ... to be initiated
by a national antitrust authority; (b) a right to bring actions
against national antitrust authorities.., before national law
courts, whenever a national antitrust authority refuses to take
appropriate measures against individual restraints of competition;

159. Wolfgang Fikentscher, The Draft InternationalAntitrust Code ("DIAC")
in the Context of International Technological Integration, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
533, 536-7 (1996).
160. See DIAC, supra note 151, at section VI of Introduction.
161. Id.
162. Id. An example of the duties of conduct is the prohibition of unfair trade
practices in Article 10bis Paris Convention.
163. See Article III of the GATT.
164. Fikentscher, supra note 159, at 537.
165. See DIAC, supra note 151, at section VI of Introduction.
166. See id.
167. See id. at section VI of Introduction.
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(c) a right to sue private persons and undertakings as alleged
parties or initiators of a restraint of competition before national
law courts asking for injunction against the execution of the
restraint; (d) a right of national appeal even when it is not a party
to the case but under the same conditions as parties to the case;
(e) the right and duty to sue a Party to this Agreement before the
International Antitrust Panel whenever it is of the opinion that
this Party violates obligations under this Agreement."' 68
While this initiative may effectively enforce the national antitrust law internationally, it also respects national sovereignty."'
This rule provides "a compromise between national and
international interests," and the national courts can play a decisive
role under this article.7
e.
Cross-borderCases-The fifth principle is that the
four principles above in the DIAC will be applicable only to crossborder cases. 7 '
Merely national cases do not fall in this
international authority but rather to national authorities and
courts.
3.
Objections Against the DIA C 7 2-While this code has
received considerable praise and attention in Europe,'73 it has
received a negative reaction in the US. 7 4 The objections against
the DIAC can be summarized with two points. First, there are
objections arising from jurisprudential reasons to govern the
DIAC. As Professor Fikentscher points out in his article, there
are arguments on what should be the governing jurisprudential
theory on the scope of antitrust law. 7 1 Second, there are also
168.
169.

Id. at Article 19, section 2.
See Ulrich Immenga, An International Antitrust Code in Perspective,
ANTITRUST REP. 13 (Aug. 1997).
170. Id.
171. See id.
172. Further discussions on the DIAC will be included in section D of part V
of this article.
173. See Waller, supra note 117 at 347 n.18.
174. See id. at 347 n.19.
175. Professor Fikentscher is one of the members of the Munich Group. See
Fikentscher, supra note 159, at 542. There are generally three different schools
on market competition. First, the "structuralist school" focuses on market
structure as the principal determinant for market performance. Second, the
"contestability school" believes that by focusing on free entry to a market, the
market will be competent as long as markets remain contestable. Third, the
"Chicago school" regards monopolies as a sign of superior efficiency if: it is not
due to from governmental barriers to market entry; monopoly profit is just
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arguments regarding the substantive scope of the DIAC. That is,
some people argue
that the DIAC covers too many substantive
•••
176
antitrust principles, while
77 the other contends that the DIAC
should cover more details.'
V.

Discussion: Should the Multilateral Approach be the One?

A. Introduction
This paper has discussed

the defects and strengths of

unilateral and bilateral approaches for resolving the problem of
extraterritorial application of competition law. In addition, it also
provided fundamental features of the multilateral approach on the

basis of the DIAC and the GATTIWTO. In this part, this paper
will discuss the answer to the question of whether, and why the
multilateral approach can prevail over the other approaches as a
better solution to extraterritorial application of competition laws.
B. Can't Delay in This Globalized World 78
International trade regulations are composed of two parts:
regulations principally by the government of each state, and

regulations by private parties. In this sense, antitrust is very much
related to the basic consensual thesis that free trade is essential for
prosperity
of human society after World War II, e.g. the Havana
C
1.
79
Charter. Therefore, appropriate agreement on private regulatemporary and operates as an incentive." Petersmann, supra note 141, at 549.
176. Professor Fox, as a member of the Munich Group, contended that the
DIAC should cover the "consensus wrong" only. DIAC, supra note 151, section
VIII of Introduction.
177. See Fikentscher, supra note 159, at 543.
178. I will try to focus my argument here on the jurisprudential or ideological
background in this international competition law argument.
179. See Wood, supra note, 117 at 281-83. However, it was rejected by the
US. Judge Wood reasoned that: "[The rejection was] not the least because of the
antitrust objections. This was somewhat awkward, since the Americans were, at
the time, the greatest publicists for antitrust on the face of the globe, and it
seemed peculiar for them to abandon an instrument that promised international
coordination of competition rules. The principal obstacles, however, actually
reflected that U.S. position: Congress was not ready to cede any antitrust
jurisdiction to the international mechanisms established by the Charter, and
furthermore, it found the language on restrictive business practices to be too
weak, as compared with the prevailing U.S. standards on these matters. Half a
loaf was not, under the circumstances, better than no loaf at all." Id. at 284. But,
I think that half a loaf was better than no loaf at all. More importantly, this
justification appears hardly compatible with her argument based on cooperation
and functionalism. Later, she expressly endorsed the cooperation but under the
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tions as well as public regulations for furtherance of free trade
should be the bread and butter of the free market economy after
the War." °
As briefly explained above, it is unfortunate to have a
stillborn international consensus on the appropriate agreement of
private regulation of free trade. Theoretically, this world should
have had a balanced consensus for free trade by appropriately
agreeing to regulate the free trade barriers from both public and
private sides. Although many reasons can be explained for such a
failure, the most important reason that we should have now is that
a well balanced agreement for free trade can be found in this very
nature of "globalized economy" today.
For example, as briefly introduced in the beginning of this
paper, there is no longer a geographical or physical limit in a
private economic entity's decision."' In addition, the globalization
may be self-conflicting because the apparently unbridled and
rampant character of Capitalism has brought the argument of
"globalization in question." ' A necessary amount of restraints
should be strongly suggested to "save" this globalized Capitalism.
In this context, current efforts to have a balanced set of
regulations in public and private sectors to preserve free trade
should not be disregarded. While appropriately applying the
public regulation measures, we now must also have private
regulations for free trade as well.
If this world is left to continue as it is, it could mean "back to
the laissez-faire," as Keynes warned."' It may be true that we do
US model. See notes 188-93 in this article.
180. No competition lawyers seem to argue on this proposition in the
international competition law argument.
181. I understand that this would mean "the players and the pressures for
future changes" in Professor Waller's words. See Waller, supra note 117 at 374391.
182. Professor Petersmann calls it "external effects." See Petersmann, supra
note 141, at 554-65. By bringing the argument to protect international "public
goods" (such as environmental protection), he contends that the international
competition law problem should be solved in the WTO by linking with the other
post-Uruguay round agendas. Id. at 574-82. See also Matsushita, supra note 145.
Professor Fox's illustrations are more vivid by providing many examples of
"hybrid restraints" that resulted from this globalization. The unsuccessful
transition to a market economy in the Eastern Europe and Russia, protectionism
and xenophobia, "new undisciplined power" by multilateral corporations in the
developing countries. Fox, supra note 8, at 894-99. See also notes 9 and 186 in
this article. Professor Waller also recognizes these problems. See Waller, supra
note 117, at 374-391. It is important to note that such restraints were caused by
the "side effects" of the globalization.
183. Cassidy, supra note 9 at 201-7. As I discussed in section C of part I, since
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not want "world disorder." It is my view that this world is in an
aimless multipolar system without clearly emerging as a hegemon,
which is very unstable.'" The same context is exactly applicable to
the international competition law argument. I think that both
unilateral and bilateral approaches are far from gaining/reaching
either "consensus" or "hegemon." If we do not experience this
global crisis, this argument on the international competition law
will never come to fruition. We want "responsible globailty."
C. Sovereignty, Retaliation,and Comity
Besides the ideological reasons for the multilateral approach,
important legal reasons can easily be found in the defects of
unilateral extraterritorial application of competition law as they
were previously discussed. The nature of the argument on the
unilateral application can be explained with three words:
sovereignty, retaliation, and comity.
Sovereignty is one of the very traditional and critical
international law principles present in almost every occasion of
unilateral application or regulation of a rule of a country that can
be inapplicable to another country, thus controversial, for any
reason. As found in Hartford Fire, the responses from the
countries being regulated are frequently retaliatory. Therefore, in
order to compromise this conflict, the international comity
principle is inevitable. However, when one party finds the
principle unnecessary or irrelevant, maybe as Justice Souter did in
HartfordFire, the other party can choose nothing but retaliation.
One effort to avoid this vicious cycle of retaliation is the
bilateral approach. The bilateral approach is skeptical about an
international harmonization of competition law effort,"' although
Professor Fox contends that such an international harmonization
externalities, high transaction
effort may cure•1 three
.
/ problems:
186
In addition, the bilateral approach
costs, and interdependence.
economists do not yet know how to manage this globalization problem, should
competition lawyers also wait until the economists reach their consensus? Maybe
not.
184. I don't see the US gained hegemony particularly since the collapse of the
Soviet Union. Please refer to the definition of hegemony at footnote 119.
According to Professor Waller, hegemony is one of the possible scenarios
affecting successful harmonization. He also agrees that the US is not he
hegemon for antitrust purposes. For details, see Waller, supra note 117, at 39197.
185. Judge Wood also proposes similar obstacles. Wood, supra note 117, at
303-9.
186. See Eleanor M. Fox, Harmonization of Law and Procedures in a
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also cannot escape from the unilateral fracture as seen in the
Agreement cracked down between the US and the EU, after
Wood Pulp, Hartford Fire, and the France's raising of the validity
of the Agreement. 87
D. The Model Debate
It is important to note here that the unilateral approach and
the bilateral approach have failed to solve this international
competition law problem, as discussed before. The unilateral
approach has invoked too many criticisms. On the other hand, the
bilateral approach may have achieved limited success. However,
its "limitedness" was revealed in the crack down of the Agreement
between the US and the EU. Neither entity ever achieves
hegemony as far as this international competition law problem is
concerned, while they are probably struggling to obtain such a
position.
Judge Wood characterizes such a supranational competition
law or harmonization effort as an "impossible dream" because of:
(1) substantially different economic conditions among the
developing nations, Eastern Europe and Russia, and the Asian
countries from those of the US or the EC; (2) the failure of
convergence of competition laws between similar countries such as
the US, Canada, and the EC.'88
Judge Wood seems to favor the US antitrust law model. The
Judge argued that the question of effective antitrust rules and the
enforcement of those rules is more crucial than internationalization of antitrust law."' The Judge further contended that it can
be achieved "in a variety of ways: bilaterally, regionally,.., and
perhaps eventually through use of the new WTO as a forum for
discussions ... ,,90
However, Judge Wood concluded, while
pursuing this, "the US will continue to enforce the US antitrust
law against conduct that harm US markets to the fullest extent of
our ability."'1 9' This approach suggests that "such a global
competitive regime can be achieved [by continuing] strong
enforcement of the US antitrust laws, whenever necessary effects
Globalized World: Why and How?, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 593, 594-95 (1991).

See

also note 182 in this article.
187. See section C of part II and section C of part III in this article.
188. See Wood, supra note 117, at 278-81.
189. Diane P. Wood, The Internationalizationof Antitrust Law: Option for the
Future, 44 DEPAUL L. REV.1289, 1298 (1995).
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1298-99.
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on US commerce are present.' ' 92 This approach seems to be
consonant with Hartford Fire. As Judge Wood argued that the
United States' priorities are vigorous enforcement and
cooperation rather than harmonization,'93 the US may continue to
attempt to promote the Sherman Act abroad as a desirable model
to follow for the time being. 94
On the other hand, Professor Fox asserts that the broader and
more sophisticated version of the European Union's competition
law is more desirable and effective than the narrower, efficiencyemphasized vision of the US antitrust law. 95 She also praises the
European Commission's leadership
in bringing the competition
96
law argument to the WTO.
According to Professor Fox, there are four approaches to
competition law and the world trading regime: (1) Munich code
(in other words, the DIAC); (2) harmonization; (3) cooperation;
(4) skeptical unilateralism and bilateralism. 97 She criticizes the
Munich code as too ambitious, despite its complete articulation of
the world code with a supra national enforcement body, and
would be unacceptable to many countries. 198 Professor Fox also
contends that the harmonization model would be unrealistic. 99
She also criticizes the fourth approach for downplaying
multilateral solutions, disregarding the existence of "some hybrid
public/private restraints, ''2 00 and overemphasizing the extent to
which national competition law can legitimately solve all antitrust

192. Id. at 1292-93.
193. Id. at 1298-99.
194. This argument is, therefore, related to the question of which model we
should follow. For the application of the Sherman Act in the Eastern European
countries, see Waller, supra note 117, at 569-71, 582-90. Professor Waller also
discusses an important preliminary issue before "the Sherman Act for Sale" such
as "the Transferability of National Law." Id. at 562-69. He also deals with
cultural issues in transferring the Sherman Act abroad under the title of "the
Indigenous Roots of Foreign Competition Law." Id. at 581-82.
195. Fox, supra note 150, at 4-12.
196. See id. at 8-9.
197. Id. at 13-19.
198. See id. at 15-16. However, in her another article, she claims to do some
action against the "some hybrid public and private restraints" of the
globalization. Fox, supra note 8, at, 894-900. Professor Petersmann also
recognizes this problem when he raises the necessity to protect the "international
public goods" such as environmental protection. I am going to argue further on
this point later in this section. See generally note 182 in this article on this point.
199. Id. at 16-17. Professor Waller also agrees with this point. See note 181 in
this article.
200. See supra note 182 regarding the "hybrid restraints."
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problems."' Professor Fox endorses the third option by expressly
stating that nations can strengthen cooperation between
competition authorities by first developing and refining bilateral
agreements
that would expand "progressively through a domino
20 2
effect."
Professor Waller provides a cooperation approach similar to
Professor Fox. However, he does not favor Professor Fox's EU
competition law model by contending that EU competition law is
not of "fundamental attraction to its neighbors," despite its many
advantages.
Professor Waller contends, based on the functionalist thesis,204 that "cooperation" between national antitrust
enforcers, as a "natural alternative" to harmonization, should be
adopted.2 5 After discussing international failures to achieve
harmonization, 2°6 he contends that limited success of cooperation
by multilateral, regional, and bilateral agreements can be
realized.2 7
It is significant to note that all four proponents, in some ways,
seem to agree that the international competition law problem
should be eventually solved multilaterally in a supra national body
such as WTO.2' Except both extreme approaches of unilateralism
and the DIAC, it can be said that all the forefront competition
lawyers advocate that such an international competition law
problem can be solved by both bilateral and multilateral
approaches. 209 Nevertheless, we have to start this argument in the
world context of globalization. As most proponents recognize the
201. Id. at 17-19.
202. Fox, supra note 150, at 13-14.
203. Waller, supra note 117, at 392-97. One commentator notes that the EU
has rule oriented dispute settlement mechanism that is less desirable than APEC
style cooperation oriented/consensus based mechanism. Thus, it could be argued
that the EU is a rather closed regime. Myung Hoon Choo, Dispute Settlement
Mechanisms of Regional Economic Arrangements and Their Effects on the World

Trade Organization(unpublished paper filed with author).
204. It means that "cooperation in small technical things will lead to
cooperation and integration in larger, more overtly political activity." Waller,
supra note 117, at 348 n.24. For more details, see ERNST B. HAAS, BEYOND THE
NATION-STATE: FUNCrIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 47-50
(1964).
205. Id. at 360-73.
206. See id. at 349-52.
207. See id at 352-74. Also, his agenda arguments are very illustrating. Id. at
397-403.
208. See note 145 (Petersmann), 190 (Wood), 196 (Fox), and 207 (Waller) in
this article.
209. However, the proportions of the two approaches in each scholar's
contention are distinctively different from each other.
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"side effects" of the globalization, it is time that we must cure
them." ° It may be too late to correct such hybrid restraints, while
refining the bilateral agreements under either the US or the EU
competition law.
In this context, I think the DIAC approach is not located in

the other extreme side in this argument. Remembering that every
proponent agrees to bring this problem to the WTO, there is the
further question of whether we should argue this problem only in

the WTO; in other words, is the WTO the right forum to argue
this international competition law problem? Noting Professor
Petersmann's argument of "linking negotiations" with the other
post-Uruguay round agendas, it is useful to bring the argument of
what is happening with the reconcilability argument between free

trade and environmental protection. In that "green round"
argument, it is not surprising that some scholars bring the
argument of establishing a new international body that deals with

this green round agenda. "
more actively

Therefore, it is also time to discuss

whether we

should have

a supra national

enforcement body that may correct the side effects of the
globalization as well as the general competition law arguments.
E. Divergence
The flip side of the question of what model or approach to

adopt to avoid conflicts in the competition law is how the rest of
the world can achieve a "compatible" competition law."'

This

section deals with policy or jurisprudential, and even, cultural
arguments in competition law. Besides the substantive divergence
on what to include in the international competition law, regardless
of the argument whether it should be the DIAC, there is no
210. See note 182 in this article.
211. For example, professor Esty calls for the "Global Environmental
Organization." DANIEL C EsTY, GREENING THE GATT: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT
AND FUTURE (1994). See also Jeffrey L Dunoff, From Green to Global: Toward
the Transformation of InternationalEnvironmental Law, 19 HARv. ENVIT'L. L.
REV. 241 (1995). For more details on the general green round argument, see I1
Hyung Jung, Reconcilability between InternationalFree Trade and Environmental
Protection: How has the US responded to the Tuna/Dolphin Decisions?
(unpublished paper filed with author).
212. As one of reasons for no true conflict, the 1995 Guideline provides that:
"more countries adopt competition laws that are 'compatible with' those of the
US. See section A of part V of this paper. However, this statement is not
persuasive, because: there is no definite model to follow; if there is and if the
model is the US model, it is not sufficiently recognized; the competition laws for
the other countries are not clearly or sufficiently "compatible with" the US
antitrust law despite many problems.
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agreement as to what jurisprudential guidance to take besides the
idiosyncratic differences of each country, including cultural
differences.
For example, when two countries such as A and B agree on
something, the agreement between them would be better
considered by taking into account the many special and
idiosyncratic differences and interests of both countries.
However, this agreement cannot be applicable to another bilateral
agreements between A and C even on the same topic that A and
B agreed.
That is, bilateral agreement on this conflict in
competition law may bring stronger ties between those two
countries. However, it is limited only to those two countries.
Therefore, no matter how many bilateral agreements country A
has on the conflict in competition law, it is far from having a single
international competition law that may provide a guide to follow.
The competition laws of the US and the EC are still
competing to gain "hegemony," which means no hegemon has yet
emerged as an alternative to achieving harmonization of
competition law."' Although there are articles discussing regional
214
•
215
216
efforts on the bilateral level such as Canada,1 Mexico, Japan,
the Eastern
European
countries,2
and the Less Developed
•
211
Countries (LDCs), it is questionable how the bilateral approach
can resolve the problem, considering these limits. Nevertheless,
because the issue of what to regulate in competition law has more
common grounds in economics, it should be less controversial than

213. Waller, supra note 117, at 392-93. Other factors are "deep integration"
and "shared visions and values." Id. at 394-97.
214. See id. at 356-60.
215. See id. See also Sergio Garcia-Rodriguez, Mexico's New Institutional
Frameworkfor Antitrust Enforcement, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1149 (1995).
216. See Lori B. Morgan & Helen S. Rosenbaum, U.S. Department of Justice
Antitrust Enforcement Policy, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 192, 195 (1993) (discussing the
DOJ's announcement on the progress of talks on the Structural Impediments
Initiative with Japanese); Wood, supra note 117, at 279 n.7 (discussing the
similarity of the Japanese Antimonopoly Law to its North American and
European counterparts); Waller, supra note 117, at 571-74; Michael Peter
Waxman, Enforcing American Private Antitrust Decisions in Japan: Is Comity
Real?, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1119 (1995); Jiro Tamura, U.S. Extraterritorial
Application of Antitrust Law to Japanese Keiretsu, 25 J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 385
(1993).
217. See Waller, supra note 117, at 569-71, 582-90.
218. See William E. Kovacic, Designing and Implementing Competition and
Consumer Protection Reforms in Transitional Economies: Perspectives from
Mongolia,Nepal, Ukraine, and Zimbabwe, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1197 (1995).
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the public regulations on trade that can be more discretionary and
subjective.
F. Equity
This is the argument especially for the LDCs and other
aggrieved countries. One of the limits of the bilateral approaches
is the limited opportunity for the aggrieved party to recover in the
case where the bilateral agreement goes wrong-for example,
there is a total lack of dispute resolutions and unilateral
abrogation of the agreement. The exact function of the WTO
should be made in the area of competition law as well, like many
disputes arising from the conflicts on public regulations of
international trade dealt in the international forum.
G. In ParallelWith Other Post-Uruguay Round Agendas
Nobody doubts the existence of the so-called post-Uruguay
Round agendas, including the "green round" and the "blue
round." Professor Petersmann particularly advocates reciprocal
"package deal negotiations," including all post-Uruguay Round
agendas such as environmental,
labor, and investment laws, under
29
1
theory.
choice
public
the
VII. Conclusion
Things change. The law should appropriately follow so as not
to lag behind. At the same time, this world has been already
globalized. Under these two theses, we are not unfamiliar with
the post-Uruguay Round issues. With the reasons presented here,
the argument on the extraterritoriality of competition law should
be solved "multilaterally and functionally" in an international
world forum that may enforce to cure the side effects of the
rampant globalization to avoid its vicious cycle of Capitalism that
may lead to trade wars.

219.

Petersmann, supra note 141, at 582.

